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THE SENATE OF CANADA



REPORT

OF THE

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON

MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

The Honourable J. S. McLENNAN, Chairman.

Printed by Order of Parliament.




OTTAWA

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PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY

1919



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ORDER OF APPOINTMENT.

May 6, 1919.

On Motion of the Honourable Mr. McLennan, it was

Ordered, That a Special Committee be appointed consisting of The Honourable Messieurs: Béique, Dandurand, Foster, Ross (Middleton), and the Mover, to consider and report on the possibility of bettering the machinery of Government, and that the said Committee be empowered to call for persons, papers and records.

EXTRACT from Minutes of Proceedings of the Committee.

COMMITTEE ROOM No. 70.

THURSDAY, May 8, 1919.


Pursuant to Rule and Notice the Special Committee of the Senate on Machinery of Government met this day at 11.30 a.m.

On Motion of the Honourable Mr. Foster, the Honourable Mr. McLennan was elected Chairman, and took the Chair.

With the Compliments of the Special Committee.

- (1) Which will involve as little change as possible in present procedure;
- (2) In the main, to such proposals as are a development of principles of government, which have received the approval of Parliament;
- (3) To such as will enhance Ministerial responsibility to Parliament;
- (4) To those which will make easier Parliamentary control of Ministerial action, both as regards shaping and carrying out the policy which has received the approval of Parliament;

2. We have made use in our deliberations of the Murray Report on the Organization of the Public Service of Canada, 1912, and have considered reports made in the United Kingdom for the same purpose as that for which this Committee was formed.



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REPORT.

THE SENATE,

COMMITTEE ROOM No. 70,

WEDNESDAY, July 2, 1919.

The Special Committee of the Senate appointed to consider and report on the possibility of bettering the machinery of Government, beg leave to make their First Report, as follows:—

1. Your Committee has not attempted, in considering the reference to them, to formulate any scheme of governmental administration which would be only of theoretical interest, but we confine ourselves to recommendations:—

- (1) Which will involve as little change as possible in present procedure;
- (2) In the main, to such proposals as are a development of principles of government, which have received the approval of Parliament;
- (3) To such as will enhance Ministerial responsibility to Parliament;
- (4) To those which will make easier Parliamentary control of Ministerial action, both as regards shaping and carrying out the policy which has received the approval of Parliament;

2. We have made use in our deliberations of the Murray Report on the Organization of the Public Service of Canada, 1912, and have considered reports made in the United Kingdom for the same purpose as that for which this Committee was formed.

I. *The Murray Report* was made in October, 1912, by the Right Honourable Sir George Murray, who was authorized by the Ministry of the day to carry on an investigation into the following matters:—

1. The methods employed in the transaction of public business;
2. The control of appropriations and expenditure;
3. The administrative methods and operations of the chief spending departments, including:—
 - (a) The manner in which appointments to the public service are made;
 - (b) The manner in which promotions within it are made;
 - (c) The manner in which retirements are effected;
 - (d) The classification of the staff and the distribution of duties in each department, and the duplication of the same or similar work in two or more departments.
 - (e) The distribution of the work between the several departments or authorities.
4. Generally the manner in which the public business of the Dominion is administered.

This gentleman had been in the British Imperial Service since 1873. He had served in the Foreign Office; the Treasury; as Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue; in the Post Office; and as permanent Secretary to the Treasury from 1903 to 1911, as well as having acted as Private Secretary to both Mr. Gladstone and Lord Roseberry during their Premier-ships. Later he served as a member of the Haldane Commission and has thus had a very wide experience of Government administration.

II. *Lord Haldane's Committee.* The Imperial Government, in 1917, appointed a committee on the machinery of Government, with the following reference:—

“To inquire into the responsibilities of the various departments of the central executive Government, and to advise in what manner the exercise and distribution by the Government of its functions should be improved.”

Its personnel was remarkable for high qualifications. Its Chairman was Lord Haldane, whose services to the Imperial Government as Secretary of War and in other positions, are so well known. Mr. Montagu had occupied most important positions in the Government. Mr. Thomas was a member of Parliament with the weight conferred on him by his Chairmanship of the National Society of Railwaymen. There were two officials, men of great experience in departmental work—one of them, Sir George Murray, who made the report on Canadian administration above mentioned. Another member was Mrs. Sidney Webb, a lady whose attainments as an investigator have caused her to be on five or six of the most important commissions established by the Imperial Government in the last ten years.

III. *Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure.* Printed 22nd October, 1918, with the following reference:—

“To examine the current Expenditure defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament and to report what, if any, economies consistent with the execution of the policy decided by the Government may be effected therein.

To make recommendations in regard to the form of Public Accounts, the system of control within the departments and by the Treasury, and the procedure of this House in relation to Supply and Appropriation, so as to secure more effective control by Parliament over Public Expenditure; and to have power to appoint from outside its own body such additional persons as it may think fit to serve on any Sub-Committee which it may appoint with the view to the preparation of such recommendations.”

As these latter reports contain matter, which on account of difference of system between the Imperial Parliament and ours, is not relevant to our enquiry, only an abstract statement is printed in appendix 1, wherein will also be found an abstract of the Murray Report. It is desirable that these abstracts should be read before the recommendation of this Committee.

These are referred to in our Report as follows:—

The report of Sir George Murray as (M).

The Haldane report as (H).

The Committee on National Expenditure as (NE).

CABINET ORGANIZATION.

4. We can, like Sir George Murray, begin with the Ministry. The proceedings of the Cabinet are, in accordance with long established constitutional usage, secret. Its members could not with advantage be called before this Committee. Some knowledge of the working of a Cabinet is, however, common to Parliamentarians. Sir George Murray had peculiar opportunities for seeing the Canadian Parliamentary system. His Report says (M para. 5):—

“Nothing has impressed me so much in the course of my enquiry, as the almost intolerable burden which the present system of transacting business imposes on the Ministers themselves. They both have too much to do, and do too much.”

5. In our system, the shaping of policy, supervision of its execution and the executive functions of Government, are by Parliament entrusted to one body of men. The members of a cabinet are in Canadian practice bound together politically by an unusually full recognition of the principle of ministerial solidarity: for example, the relatively high degree of control of expenditure by the Imperial Treasury is in Canada exercised, not by the Minister of Finance, but by the submission of the proposals by the minister interested to his colleagues in council (M. paras. 8 and 9 and 24):—

“Almost every decision of a Minister, even of the most trivial importance, is thus—at least in theory—brought before his colleagues for the purpose of obtaining their collective approval, which is necessary for its validity.”

“Provisions to this effect can be traced in almost every Act of Parliament which has been passed since Confederation; and it seems clear that the statesmen of that time thought it necessary to ensure that the collective responsibility of the Cabinet for the action of individual Ministers should be protected by safeguards of this kind.”

“ . . . At present they appear to transact in this capacity a great deal of business which need not engage their attention and could be equally well done by others”

6. Although this is all that can be stated positively on Canadian practice, we can, however, refer with advantage in this report to what has been said at Westminster on the Cabinet practice in that Parliament, which is a model to our own and all other similar bodies, which, moreover, with great respect for precedent, has modified from time to time its procedure according to current necessities.

We have no fear that, with due allowances for differences in conditions, what is stated about the Imperial Cabinet is not true of our own.

7. The peers on both sides who spoke in this debate in the main (see App. II) agreed that the cabinet of twenty-two or three was cumbersome, that the old methods of conducting business were poor, and that a new system would have to be devised. This is also the opinion of Lord Haldane's Committee, and this view of governmental functions seems implicit in Sir George Murray's report.

8. It seems desirable to draw attention to the possibility of confusion in language, as the working Privy Council, the Cabinet and the Ministry are in Canada the same persons. In the English reports and debates, the language implies that the Cabinet discharges functions as defined below, the duties of ministers are executive, and ministers as a body do not attend meetings of the Cabinet. This report follows the English use of these words and their derivatives.

9. The Lord Haldane report defines, and we agree, that the main functions of the Cabinet are:—

“The shaping of policy; the control of the executive, if that policy receives the sanction of Parliament; and the continuous co-ordination and delimitation in the activities of the various departments of Government.”

Determination of policy or deliberation to reach the highest degree of fruitfulness requires:—

(1) A full and accurate knowledge of the subject, which will often require expert advice;

(2) Time for consideration of the matter in all its bearings, so that divergence may be harmonized and a consensus of opinion obtained among those responsible for the course of action determined on;

(3) That the deliberative body shall be small enough to take counsel effectively and yet large enough in the present condition of Canadian public opinion to give assurance that no important element in our national life was inadequately represented; and,

(4) Such arrangement of public business that the time necessary for deliberation be not curtailed by the claims of other public duties.

10. Before considering various rearrangements of administrative work by which these ends may be attained, it is desirable to refer to certain considerations which seem to indicate that great care should be taken before any changes were made which would unduly hamper a Prime Minister, or so seriously alienate public and parliamentary sympathy, that the consequent hostility would imperil the successful working of the new procedure, and chill the loyalty of the supporters of an administration carrying on the business of the Dominion at a time when burdens are so heavy and problems so perplexing.

These considerations are:—

(1) Under our system of Government the Prime Minister is individually responsible for the colleagues he chooses and the assignment of their duties. It would follow that he should not be circumscribed by any rigid system in his freedom of action. Moreover, political considerations which no Prime Minister could disregard might easily make it desirable for him to increase his colleagues to a number beyond what would be justified by any logical arrangement of ministerial duties.

(2) That the freedom of selection which a Prime Minister can exercise in the choice of his colleagues is most seriously hampered by demands for Cabinet representation based on grounds of race, region and religion. So uniformly ever since Confederation have these claims, not directly connected with sagacity in council or administrative skill, been recognized, that they have attained (particularly among Parliamentarians considering themselves of cabinet rank) almost the force of a constitutional principle. Any marked change would excite a hostile disposition, before the good effects of a new system could become apparent.

(3) That if the change involved a small cabinet, undoubtedly, to be regarded as of superior rank to the ministers, personal factors might prevent smooth working. These would arise from the natural desire of men of ministerial rank not to be placed in a position of inferiority to their colleagues,

which has shown itself by the course of events in the past in Canada, where offices created as of a subaltern grade have been given ministerial rank, and secondly, the enhancement of this feeling on the part of individuals considered for these positions, by the fact that with few exceptions all of them are regarded, both within and without Parliament, as representatives of various districts and of elements in the community.

11. Such difficulties as these are, however, of a character which, as the necessities of the State for economical and effective administration become more widely apparent, would make them surmountable by a Prime Minister in whose intention and force to secure these ends Parliament had confidence.

12. During recent years the Canadian Cabinet proceeded no further in development than the second stage of English change in procedure, viz., increase of the ministry and devolution of certain functions to committees of its own members, and to other committees and commissions, a method of administrative working abandoned as impractical in the United Kingdom. Note that Mr. Bonar Law and other gentlemen refused to join Mr. Lloyd George if he proposed to have a large cabinet (App. 11). It was followed there by a small deliberative cabinet and a large number of ministers. This has proved successful enough to be continued by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, after the last general election.

13. We may anticipate later paragraphs in our report by stating here that projects we recommend will tend to minimize the public demand for local representation in the Ministry through providing for it in another way (Par. 22), and by reducing the field in which local cabinet representation is of much local importance (Par. 33-43).

14. If, on account of the considerations above stated, conditions in Canada would make inopportune the divisions of an administration into a Cabinet a deliberative body without portfolios and a Ministry charged with executive duties, the same considerations would in a distinctly lesser degree interfere with attaining the same end in another way, viz., by having a Cabinet, holding recognized offices of State, enabled to give their time to deliberation and supervision by an organization of departmental work which would make their ministerial duties purely supervisory. This course, however, presents few difficulties for it would be entirely a matter of internal arrangement between the Prime Minister and his colleagues.

15. There is a third course, which we consider could be introduced with the least degree of disturbance, viz., to make the members of the administration as at present holders of portfolios, but reduce their number to say nine or not more than eleven, so that it would be a body not entirely too large for deliberation. By giving its members assistance in their Parliamentary duties, by definitely relegating to their deputies purely administrative departmental work, and by the devolution of certain ministerial duties, a devolution, it may be theoretically unsound but practically advantageous, the members of a Ministry would have time for more important duties now often most seriously interfered with by these other claims on their time and energy.

SECRETARIAT.

16. Whichever course may be adopted, it seems desirable that the administration should abandon, as has been abandoned in the United Kingdom the long established practice of keeping no record of Cabinet proceedings. It is not credible that such inconveniences have not arisen in Canada as Lord Curzon speaks of, when in the intimacy of his knowledge of Cabinet working in Britain he says, that there was no agenda; there was no order of business; that no record was kept of the proceedings: "that a Minister went away and acted upon what he thought was a decision which subsequently turned out to be no decision at all or was repudiated by his colleagues," and that there was the utmost difficulty in securing decisions because the Cabinet was

always congested with business. (App. II, p. 21.) The proper carrying on of public business demands a proper organization which would include a staff to prepare for council meetings, expedite business at them, and promptly communicate the decisions in council to those concerned.

The foremost of the duties of the head of such a staff would be:—

(a) The keeping of such notes of Cabinet meetings as seemed desirable to its members.

(b) To prepare for the approval of the Prime Minister the agenda of meetings.

(c) The preparation and submission to the members of the Cabinet, in advance, of such information as may be necessary to the formation of opinion.

(d) Communication to Ministers concerned of decisions of the Cabinet.

(e) To act as liaison officer between the Cabinet and Ministerial committees of the Privy Council, as well as between departments.

(f) and that he should arrange for and be present at the interdepartmental conferences to which we shall later refer.

17. We believe that, when the conduct of ministerial business is revised, one reform suggested by Sir George Murray (M. 18, 19, 20), i.e. that the passing of formal Orders in Council will be relegated to small committees of the ministry specially summoned for this purpose, will be included. The Secretary of the Cabinet, if existing, would be the proper channel to keep the Cabinet and other Ministers informed of what was done at these meetings.

18. We are aware that we are proposing an establishment the head of which should be a man of high ability, attainments and character. He should have the standing of a Deputy Minister and if the Parliament of Canada should prove to be more fearful of interfering with long established practice than that of the United Kingdom there would be no constitutional difficulty in making this officer, for the time being, a member of the Privy Council. It may be pointed out also that a position among his assistants would afford the most admirable training for the highest positions in the Civil Service or for a Parliamentary career.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCES.

19. It is believed that there is substantial ground for the opinion that there is overlapping between departments in investigation and executive work (M. par. 124-126). We recommend that conferences between departments could in public affairs serve the same good purpose as they do in great industrial and commercial organizations. The Secretary to the Cabinet, being in touch with all phases of government work would in our opinion be the proper officer to summon and preside over such meetings.

DEPARTMENTAL CO-ORDINATION.

Evidence taken before a Special Committee of the Senate within the last few days has given specific instance of the need for some system which would secure the communication of information from one Department to another. That evidence developed the fact that there was no co-ordination between the work of two branches, one of which had an intimate bearing on the work of the other. It is not probable that this is an isolated case. Much of this overlapping and lack of co-operation would be corrected by the grouping of agencies on lines of similar service to which we refer (para 23); much of it should also disappear through the agency of the Secretariat to the Cabinet and of inter-departmental conferences, but considering the importance of the effective

conduct of public business and the saving of expense, we feel that it is a matter which should as promptly as possible be given adequate attention.

20. A reduction of the Cabinet in number to the extent we have suggested (to be discussed later) will carry with it, to secure the intended results certain extensions of systems already used not only in Canada but in other countries. Both those recommended are forms of devolution of authority, in one case of the minister in the second of the administration. The relation of a minister to his deputy has been well stated by Sir George Murray in these words:—

“The business of a minister is not to administer, but to direct policy. When a minister has laid down a line of policy to be adopted in his department, the carrying out of this policy, or in other words the administration of the department, should be left to his subordinates.

“If I venture to make this statement in a rather dogmatic form, it is because I am convinced that it is the foundation of any sound system of departmental organization.”

“Under the conditions which now prevail in Canada, and to which I have already referred, it is essential that a Minister, if he is to have time for the consideration of questions of policy and for his other important duties, should be relieved as far as possible of all purely administrative work. This, of course, involves the imposition of greater responsibility on the deputy heads of departments. Their duty should be to give executive effect to the minister's decision. They should be charged with the whole responsibility for the administration of their department, and should be the only channel through which the minister acts.

“I realize of course, that under any such scheme the deputy heads would require to be selected with great care, and that more power would be placed in their hands than under the existing system. But I cannot believe that it is impossible to find competent men to fill these positions under the new conditions which I have indicated.”

(M. Par. 25-28.)

21. The duties of a minister are the shaping of departmental policy, securing the approval of his colleagues, and later of Parliament, the supervision of its execution, and its advocacy and defence in Parliament. As a political head he is bound to promote the interests of his party, a duty not likely to be overlooked, for the instinct of political self preservation is as strongly developed in the political heads of a party as the ordinary form of this instinct in the citizen. The minister is expected to check the bureaucratic rigidity of his subordinate officials, and of him is demanded a conduct of departmental affairs neither falling below nor too far in advance of what the public will accept as satisfactory administration. These duties particularly in the more important departments would leave inadequate time for deliberation and supervision.

22. We propose that time be made for these duties by the employment of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries as assistants to the ministers. We conceive that their highest usefulness will be found by not circumscribing their duties to occasional replies to a question in Parliament, but by making them active and indispensable forces in the working of the departments. They should assist the minister in the formation of policy. They should relieve him of the greater part of interviews with the public, which now displays a tendency to bring the most trivial matters to the personal attention of the minister. In short, a wise minister would delegate to his Under-Secretary all the work, the latter can do both within and without Parliament not as little as possible. In this way and in this way alone can the minister gain needed time. We think it probable that when the initial difficulties of changing any system have been overcome, that by enhancing the importance and prestige of his Under-Secretary, the minister himself will gain in importance and prestige. The secretaries will also gain valuable training and those among them who display sound judgment and breadth of view will qualify for promotion to higher positions.

It may be pointed out that if Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of the right type be appointed with the scope of their duties as wide as we recommend, and if they receive from, as well as give to their ministers loyal co-operation, the system will go far to secure better Government. It will also satisfy that claim for local representation in the administration in positions but one degree less important than those of the ministers; a claim which has to be reckoned with by every Prime Minister.

THE DIVISIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS.

23. The principle on which governmental functions are classified in recent British reports on investigations similar to those of this Committee in *similarity of service* and not similarity of persons for whom that service is performed. This principle has been recognized by our Government in the recent installation of the Department of Health, which will discharge duties, *inter alia*, previously performed by practically all the departments which deal with the public. This Committee, accepting the principle, formulates as a basis for classification the following divisions of the functions of Government, not as exhaustive or applicable to all countries, but dealing only with those now exercised, or which may be exercised by the Government of the Dominion—and as the functions of a Cabinet have been previously dealt with, only the executive functions are included in this survey.

24. The functions of executive government may be divided into these classes:—

I. *Basic*.—Those without the adequate performance of which the other duties of government could not be discharged.

These are:—

Defence.—Naval and Military, and the maintenance of internal order.

Justice.—The administration of justice, without which an ordered society could not exist.

Finance.—The raising of a revenue to defray the expenses of the State, and supervision of the expenditure of that revenue in so far as that supervision is ministerial and not parliamentary.

II. *Services to the public as a nation or as individuals*.

These may be subdivided into Fiduciary, Regulative, and Productive.

Fiduciary. Those services wherein the Government acts as guardian for the nation of its public domain.

Public, Admiralty and Ordnance lands, Fisheries, Mines, etc., for groups and individuals;

Indian Affairs;

Depositors in Government Savings Banks;

Purchasers of Annuities, and if instituted in Canada, Unemployment, Insurance and Old Age Pensions.

III. *Regulative*: are those functions concerned with the definition of powers, and supervision of the exercise of those powers conferred on corporations, and the restriction (in the public interest) of the freedom of the individual or association.

These are:—

(a) The control of Banking, Insurance and other Joint Stock companies.

(b) The control of rates and services by Railway, Telegraph and Telephone and Express companies, and of their mutual relations.

(c) Patent rights, copyright.

(d) The supervision of occupations and equipment which affect the safety and convenience of the public, such as navigation—the officers, pilots of vessels, engineers, and of vessels and their equipment.

(e) Standardization and inspection: Grain, Gas and Electricity, Weights and Measures.

IV. *Productive*.—Those functions which tend to increase the number, the social well-being and the economic efficiency of the people:

Health;

Immigration;

Labour;

Trade and commerce;

Agriculture;

Communications and transport, including post office, railways, canals, steamship services and subsidies, waterways.

V. *External Affairs*.—Relations with other nations.

VI. *Auxiliary Services*.—Those not directly for service to the public, but serving to enhance the effectiveness of the foregoing.

Legal advice;

Research and information;

Manufacturing and constructive, e.g., printing, public works;

Records;

Archives;

Statistics.

25. If the status of a Minister be considered as that of a political head as before defined, and retrospection will show that technical knowledge or training has not been always considered necessary for the holding of a portfolio, we consider that the present Cabinet of twenty (two without portfolios, and two in their nature temporary, the Minister of Overseas Forces, and second, although this department will be for some years useful, the Ministry of Civil Re-establishment) could be reduced.

26. In Appendix III are statements showing the arrangements of ministerial functions, in the United Kingdom, other Dominions and certain foreign countries. Canada it will be seen has the highest number of ministers of any of these countries with the exception of Great Britain, although most of these Governments have administrative duties such as Colonies and Education which are not discharged by the Dominion Government.

27. We suggest tentatively the following composition of a Cabinet:—

I. Prime Minister, President of the Council, Minister of External Affairs.

II. Secretary of State.

III. Justice.

IV. Finance (including Customs and Internal Revenue).

V. Interior (including Immigration and Colonization).

VI. Ministry Defence.

VII. Communication and Transport, now Railways and Canals, Marine, and Post Office.

VIII. Production and Distribution (including Trade and Commerce, Fisheries and Agriculture).

IX. Labour.

X. Public Works.

It seems to provide for all the administrative duty of Government; to be not hopelessly too large for deliberation, and with a proper systematization of public business (*M. passim*) to give promise of an improvement on the present system.

28. It may be noted that in Great Britain the Haldane report (II. 55) reduces the great Departments of Government to ten. It does not necessarily follow, the report goes on, that there would be only one Minister for each of these branches.

29. We point out that the *effective* Ministry namely the Ministers and the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries (for several portfolios such as Finance, Defence, Public Works and Production will require more than one Under-Secretary) will not in number or expense fall below the present Cabinet establishment. The advantage however in the more efficient carrying on of public business will more than offset these disadvantages. What is produced by outlay is as essential an element as the amount of the outlay in estimating the desirability of any scheme.

THE DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS.

30. It has been the practice of all Cabinets to delegate, with the consent of Parliament, certain of their duties to committees of their own Members and to other Committees or Commissions. Of the latter there are two classes, outside temporary organizations for temporary ends. The first, organizations which demand from their members the exercise of such quasi-judicial functions which could not be expected from Ministers engrossed by other affairs and constantly subjected to criticism, often virulent, not only of their actions but of their motives. The second class are such bodies as consist of members having special qualifications for dealing with the matters entrusted to them, willing to serve the State in an independent position, but not willing to take the status of departmental officers. Both these classes of organizations have the very great advantage that their decisions and actions carry weight with the public, in the ratio that the public believes that they are uninfluenced by party considerations. This public acceptance would not be given as freely to the actions of the same individuals if they were subordinates of a Minister.

It was the recognition of these considerations which led to the Auditor-General being made an officer of Parliament; not of the Department of Finance, also, for example, to the establishment of the Railway Commission rather than a committee of officials of the Department of Railways and Canals dealing with the same matters.

There has been no time in the history of Canada when public confidence in the efficiency of Government was more needed than the present.

31. These considerations lead us to recommend two Boards, the functions of which are less difficult than those of the principal commissions now existing, but which we believe will tend to increase confidence in the administration as well as make it easier for the Government to reject improper proposals for the spending of public money.

32. We believe that these Boards, properly constituted, namely, small in number and permanent, and with the right personnel, would, at least as effectively as the agencies of the Departments, deal with the problems referred to them. They would have the advantage of commanding greater confidence, and in addition would ensure to the Government acting on their findings the advantage of disclosing fully to Parliament the facts on which the action of the Administration were based.

TARIFF BOARD.

33. We recommend a Tariff Board with powers to investigate (both as directed by Parliament and of their own motion), all problems connected with production, transportation and living conditions in Canada, and in those countries the production of which competes with Canada, either in home or foreign markets, in so far as tariffs are an element in these questions.

34. It would be inadvisable in our opinion if such a Board be established to limit the scope of its powers of investigations. The effect of tariffs on the cost of production, and therefore on the well-being of the whole people, as well as on the capacity of Canadians to compete with foreigners in the markets of the Dominion, and with other nations in common markets, is far reaching and complex.

35. It is within the knowledge of those who have followed the course of industrial development that industries have through inadequate or inaccurate information been established, languished and died, with loss of capital and dissipation of energy. It is probable on the other hand, that there are industries which might be with advantage transplanted to Canada. The Board might by its investigations and the dissemination of its findings prevent loss, and make easier new forms of production.

36. At no time more than the present have industrial and economic conditions changed more rapidly. At no time has the avoidance of failure and of the increase of stable production been more important. We therefore think it for the advantage of Canada that this Board be established to prepare and have available information on all phases of these questions for the guidance of the Government, of Parliament, and for the information of the public.

37. We wish with emphasis to state that it is not our intention to propose the establishment of a Board with other powers than investigation and statement of facts. To confer on any Board powers to frame a tariff would be a devolution of a function of which a government should not debarrass itself.

38. We believe, however, that in a matter which excites such lively passions, which threatens the unity of the people, a full statement of the facts of each phase of this complicated question, by an independent Board would be of great value. We say this without any doubt that the minister concerned has an organization which ascertains to his satisfaction conditions affecting tariff questions. These facts are not usually disclosed. It does not tend to allay unrest to take on trust his decisions, whereas the reports of this Board would be open to all and would convince the fair-minded.

39. The composition of such a Board should represent the consumer, the producer, labour, and the expert in these matters. It should be appointed by Parliament and be permanent.

40. We are aware that the above indications of the scope of the duties of the Tariff Board would trench on those of a Trade Board, or any other organization to increase the volume of Canadian trade.

We are not concerned with the precise form of organizations to be established. That form must be arranged by the Government. We are confident, however, that the Tariff Board would produce good results, and we are equally confident that conditions require the wholesome stimulation of Canadian production and commerce to the highest degree.

THE PUBLIC WORKS BOARD.

41. The Public Works Board should be established to report to Parliament and to the ministry on all proposals to the Government for expenditures on public works, or departmental expenditures such as for public buildings. This Board would examine into these proposals and report on the national importance of each project, the value to the community directly to be benefited, and the ratio of these advantages to the estimated cost to be paid from the National Treasury. The board would be empowered to propose alternative schemes, to employ experts, and its findings should be before Parliament before proposals of expenditure dealing with matters referred to the board were brought down.

42. It is not proposed that this Board should have selective power, as to priority of execution of approved projects, that being a matter of policy, is absolutely a function of the Ministry.

43. Again, while this Board would guard the interests of the taxpayer, it would be of small service to Canada if its point of view were not based on a high degree of foresight as well as on wide knowledge. We may summarize the advantages of this Board,

(1) The free revenues of Canada are small as compared with its necessary annual expenditure.

(2) It is important that economic rather than party ends be served by their outlay.

(3) Pressure for this kind of expenditure is strongest from parties with personal interests to serve, and from the member who urges expenditure in the locality he represents even where this is not the case.

(4) The local advisers of a Minister such as the Resident Engineer, are susceptible to local influences.

(5) This Board would protect the ministry from applications which will not stand investigation, and thus avoid creating animosity.

(6) When confidence in this Board is established, it may be the Government will submit to it of the Government's own projects that these may obtain the support which the approval of such a Board would bring.

44. These advantages we believe will offset, the delay involved in examination and report by this Board. These investigations will unquestionably take time, but all conversant with public affairs will admit, we believe, that the country has suffered more from embarking on enterprises without knowing their consequences and their cost, than from taking time for a thorough examination. If this has been the case in years of surplus revenue, still more certain is it that well informed and cautious action is desirable in the immediate future.

CONTROL BY PARLIAMENT.

45. There inheres in the two Houses of Parliament the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of Government. Parliament appoints its Committee, the Cabinet, to perform certain functions, either directly or by organizations to which the Cabinet, with the sanction of Parliament, has delegated certain more or less closely-defined powers. It is also established that in normal cases and times, it is necessary for Parliament to validate the action of the Government by antecedent approval of the Government's projects, and also it is within the competence of Parliament to examine and express approval or disapproval of the manner in which these projects have been carried out.

46. Various causes, some inherent in human nature, some the result of external circumstances, combine to make the performance of these duties less effective than the well-being of the country demands.

47. This is particularly the case with the proposals of the Government which involve the expenditure of public money. Relatively less information concerning these matters is laid before Parliament than is the case with general legislation, and there are more opportunities for examination of such legislation in the various stages through which these Bills pass. It is indisputable that with the burdens the Dominion is carrying and will have to carry, care should be exercised to minimize national expenditure. It is equally indisputable that this duty ultimately rests upon the members of Parliament and that neither pressure of business nor confidence in a ministry absolves them from its proper discharge.

48. Its proper discharge necessitates the placing before Parliament full information, as accurate and impartial as possible, so that every member can inform himself if he cares so to do as to the merits of each project on which as a trustee for the taxpayer he is called on to vote.

49. Judgment by Parliament is now established through two agencies, the Public Accounts Committee and the supervision of the Auditor General. Both these agencies are retroactive, the former being only in a position to call attention of Parliament to expenditures which have already been made. Your committee believes that it is desirable that agencies should be set up to make the control of expenditure take place at a stage where Parliament may control expenditure and not merely criticize it. These agencies should provide for Parliament information necessary for its members to pass a sound judgment of proposals submitted to them; and secondly, some form of procedure which will make easier than at present the formation, by members of Parliament, of such judgment. We have recommended the establishment of two Boards to secure this end within two important spheres of governmental action (par. 33-43).

PROCEDURE OF PARLIAMENT.

50. A recent English report contains the following statement referring to the Committee of the Whole:—

“But a so-called committee of 670 members cannot effectively consider the details of finance. The time at its disposal is closely restricted. It cannot examine witnesses. It has no information before it but the bulky volume of the estimates themselves, the answers of a Minister to questions addressed to him in debate, and such facts as some private member may happen to be in a position to impart. A body so large, so limited in its time, so ill-equipped for inquiry, would be a very imperfect instrument for the control of expenditure even if the discussions in Committee of Supply were devoted entirely to that end. But those discussions afford the chief, sometimes the only, opportunity in the course of the year for the debate of grievances and of many questions of policy. In the competition for time, those matters, of greater interest and often of greater importance, usually take precedence, and questions of finance are crowded out. And even if all these obstacles are overcome and some rare occasion arises on which the House of Commons discovers and debates a case where a reduction in an estimate appears desirable, and would be disposed to insist upon its view, the present practice, which regards almost every vote of the House as a vote, not only on the merits of the question but for or against the Government of the day, renders independence of action impossible.” (U.K. H.C. 121, 1918.)

The Committee considers this statement as applicable to the Parliament of Canada, due consideration being given to the difference in numbers and of relatively less complex series of questions with which the Canadian Parliament, as compared with that of the United Kingdom has to deal.

51. We do not feel that it is desirable for a Committee of the Senate to make recommendations which could only be carried out through action of another branch of Parliament. We, however, draw attention to the report of the Committee on National Expenditure and its recommendations.

52. We further point out in reference to the Senate Committee on Finance recently formed that its duties to be adequately performed will be onerous, and that incomplete and cursory examination will be no guide to the Senate in its deliberations upon these matters. We commend to the notice of this Committee the recommendation of the Committee on National Expenditure that a similar Committee in the Imperial Parliament would require an Examiner of Estimates to make its work effective. We would further draw attention to the method by which the French Corps Legislatif deals with its examinations of expenditure.

THE FRENCH BUDGET COMMISSION.

53. Under the French system of Parliamentary Government the whole body of deputies is divided by lot into eleven bureaux. In the Autumn say of 1918 the Minister of Finance begins to prepare his Budget for the year 1920. When, after consultation with his colleagues this is prepared, it is presented to the Budget Commission which consists of 33 members, 3 being elected by each Bureau, with the disadvantage, as the division of the Members of the Chamber by Bureaux is by lot, that, if it by hazard placed in one Bureau five or six members with special competence in Finance, only three of them could serve on this Commission. The proceedings of the Committee are secret. It elects its officers, among them a Reporter General, and reporters for all the sub-sections of the Budget. The Reporter General is in a Parliamentary sense, the most important officer of the Commission, as he presents the Budget to the Chamber. He is, in truth, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He presents the Report as a whole. Each of the reporters for sections of the Budget as well as all other matters of administrative interests, also present to the Chamber their views and suggestions on the matters with which they are especially charged. The system affords scope for Members of Parliament to become thoroughly familiar with various aspects of administration; to make suggestions of reform and to impress the Chamber with their competence and ability, thus affording a valuable training for higher Parliamentary positions. There are two main disadvantages to this form of a Budget Commission which would make it inapplicable to our Parliamentary system. The first is that the division of the Chamber into the bureaux by lot and the limitation to each lot of three members does not make for a selection or a Budget Commission which would command a confidence of Houses based as are ours on a party system. In the second place, the power of the Commission to augment expenditures strikes at ministerial responsibility. From what information your Committee can obtain as to French practice this system of Budget Commission is, however, well established in France. (There is further reference to it in Bodley's "France", Volume 2, Page 220, et seq.) There is also a further possible enhancement of parliamentary control in

INDIVIDUAL MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

54. The doctrine of the solidarity of the Cabinet on all questions of policy is well established. It has been questioned however whether that joint ministerial responsibility should extend to the executive actions of a Minister, the course he takes in carrying out the policy which has been sanctioned by his colleagues; these reasons are given for this view. It is not humanly possible for a Cabinet to examine adequately the proposals of each executive member:

Nor with the congestion of business in the Privy Council, is it reasonable to hold that the sanction of an Order in Council approving the action of a Minister, is enough to make his colleagues as a body responsible for the Minister's actions.

We therefore point out as worthy of consideration the advantage of a change by which a Minister should be responsible for his administrative acts, even if those acts have in Council received a sanction which in the nature of things could not be other than formal. When they had been seriously discussed it would still be possible for the Government as a whole to accept responsibility. Such a change to be practical must be pointed out, would be a change in spirit,—“in fact and in custom”—which would leave Parliament free to vote on the strict merits of administrative acts, uncomplicated by any wider issue. (See N.E., par. 17).

55. This course would heighten the responsibility of the Minister, and strengthen his position in resisting pressure, by establishing a personal and direct for a diluted responsibility. It would also make it easier for a Prime Minister to replace a col-

league who does not hold the confidence of Parliament. We may point out that this principle of Cabinet responsibility for policy, individual ministerial responsibility for execution, is established in the Constitution of the French Republic.

RESEARCH AND INFORMATION.

56. It will be seen by reference to the tabulation of executive functions comparing those of Canada and the United States (Appen. IV) that the Dominion is relatively not inadequately supplied with organizations for the collection of information.

57. It does not seem necessary to dwell on the need of a country which is to hold a high position, to fortify itself for the task by a provision of agencies, first for the solution of problems which underlie sound legislation and administrative regulations: and second, of those fundamental economic or industrial problems, which will make more thorough or more immediately available for exploitation the natural resources of the country.

So much impressed is the Haldane Committee with this necessity, that it places Research and Information among the ten main functions of Government (H. par. 55) and gives a long chapter (IV) to the details of this subject.

It is not within the province of this Committee to suggest at the present time the proper organization of this service.

58. We desire, however, to point out that there is necessity for some agency which could collect, collate and keep available for inquirers, information now dispersed and only to be found by prolonged search. (*e.g.* Documents dealing with public affairs in Great Britain seem to come more regularly to the Department of External Affairs, than to the Library of Parliament.)

59. Physical conditions make it impossible at present to consider the establishment of this service in its natural place, the Library of Parliament. We recommend the inauguration of this central service of collection and collation as soon as practicable. It would not require that all books and documents should be gathered under one roof, but only that at one place, the inquirer could ascertain promptly the information which exists on any particular subject and where such information could be obtained.

60. In conclusion, we reiterate our opinion that the difficulties which confront the country can be most easily surmounted by an arrangement of governmental machinery which;

Will give a cabinet time for mature deliberation and supervision of the executive;

Will make Parliamentary control real and not formal;

Will secure full and accurate information as a basis for the decisions of the Government and of Parliament;

And such modification in the practice of Parliament as will secure the consideration of ministerial proposals and ministerial administration other than questions of policy, each on its individual merits, and not bound up with the issues of party success.

61. The satisfactory working of boards and commissions to which has been entrusted functions which under less difficult conditions were discharged by the Ministry, such as the Railway and the Purchasing Boards, the International Joint Commission, the Grain Board, and others, gives us confidence in recommending the establishment of the two boards we suggest. We do not doubt that others may be found necessary.

62. With reference to the possibility that any Government discharging the heavy responsibilities of such times as these, may be hampered by an indisposition to accept changes in current practice, we say, that in many important respects great changes have occurred and been accepted, and that the changes which will be brought about in

the Parliamentary sphere by the transfer of appointments to the Civil Service Commission, by the substitution of the Purchasing Board for departmental buying, by the results of the two boards we propose, will tend to make acceptable the modifications of present practice which we have suggested.

63. Your Committee recommend that fifteen hundred copies of the foregoing report and appendices be printed in pamphlet form for public distribution, and that Rule 100 be suspended in so far as it relates to the said printing.

All which is respectfully submitted.

J. S. McLENNAN,
Chairman.

APPENDIX I.

THE MURRAY REPORT.

His report is dated the 30th of November, 1912. Since that time modifications in the Civil Service Act and the work of the Privy Council have modified the facts on which the conclusion published in his report are based. The following is a brief summary of his report under the different heads, on dealing with subjects which are of present moment:

1. Methods employed in the transaction of public business,—

“5. Nothing has impressed me so much in the course of my inquiry as the almost intolerable burden which the present system of transacting business imposes on Ministers themselves. They both have too much to do and do too much.

“6. Speaking broadly, it may be said that every act of the Executive Government, or of any member of it, requires the *sanction of the Governor in Council, which, under present practice, is identical with the Cabinet.*”

“8. Almost every decision of a Minister, even of the most trivial importance, is thus—at least in theory—brought before his colleagues for the purpose of obtaining their collective approval, which is necessary for its validity.”

In reference to para. 8 he points out that provisions to this effect can be traced since Confederation and its successive Ministries have carried on a practice based on almost absolute collective responsibility of the Cabinet. He points out that the business of government necessarily grows both in amount and in complexity, and therefore;—

“12. The only means by which this growth can be met is by division of labour, and devolution of power. In the absence of some continuous process of this kind the machinery of Government must gradually become less efficient and must ultimately break down under the stress imposed upon it.”

The first recommendation is that many of the powers now vested in the Governor in Council should by some process of devolution be transferred to individual Ministers. (Para. 14, and further para. 16,) that a committee of Ministers should review the whole of the duties now discharged by Council and select those which can safely be left to the discretion of individual Ministers, and as an alternative, (para. 17,) that if this be considered too drastic, a board of two or three Ministers might be constituted and charged with the duty of considering all appointments and promotions.

He again proposes, (para. 19,) that formal sanction of executive action required to be given by Council could be done at special meetings at which it would be unnecessary for the whole body of Ministers to attend. He does not consider para. 21, that many of the duties now discharged by the Treasury Board should be referred to it, viz.: those in connection with appointments, promotions, etc., etc., nor, para. 24, that such business as the signing of requisitions for furniture, etc., should be countersigned by the Minister of the Department in interest.

"25. The business of a Minister is not to administer, but to direct policy. When a Minister has laid down a line of policy to be adopted in his Department, the carrying out of this policy, or in other words the administration of the Department, should be left to his subordinates.

"If I venture to make this statement in a rather dogmatic form it is because I am convinced that it is the foundation of any sound system of departmental organization.

"26. Under the conditions which now prevail in Canada, and to which I have already referred, it is essential that a Minister, if he is to have time for the consideration of questions of policy and for his other important duties, should be relieved as far as possible of all purely administrative work. This, of course, involves the imposition of greater responsibility on the Deputy Heads of Departments. Their duty should be to give executive effect to the Minister's decisions; they should be charged with the whole responsibility for the administration of their Departments, and should be the only channel through which the Minister Acts."

"27. I realize, of course, that under any such scheme the Deputy Heads would require to be selected with great care, and that more power would be placed in their hands than under the existing system. But I cannot believe that it is impossible to find competent men to fill these positions under the new conditions which I have indicated."

He ends this section of his report directed to the relief of the Ministers by suggesting that in the more important Departments there should be a political Deputy Minister, a course which has been taken in the appointments of various Parliamentary Under-Secretaries.

II. THE CONTROL OF APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES.

This control may be considered from two points of view; the control of the government over its own departments and the control exercised by Parliament over the proposals of the Government.

"31. The latter may I think be regarded as negligible for the present purpose. In theory control of Parliament over expenditure is complete; in practice it is of little value. This is partly due to the fact that as the Government must necessarily command a majority in the House of Commons, it can generally secure the passing of its own estimates; and partly because notwithstanding many professions of a desire for economy in the abstracts, members will generally be found demanding increased expenditure for purposes in which their constituencies are interested, rather than reductions on items which do not fall under this category.

"32. In short, the control of public expenditure must depend almost entirely on the Government of the day; and here again we shall generally find that individual Ministers, while not unwilling to acquiesce in the reduction of the estimates of other Departments, are *prima facie* disposed to recommend increased expenditure in their own.

"33. The Minister of Finance, who is responsible for raising the necessary taxation, is therefore, as a rule, the only Minister who has a strong inducement to press for economy.

The point of time at which he can use his influence with the best effect, is while the estimates are under consideration and before they have been presented to Parliament. Proposals for expenditure which have passed this stage may be regarded in practice as unlikely to be further amended, except in the direction of increase."

He believes that the system under which estimates are at present framed, criticized and presented, does not promote economical administration and suggests, para. 37, that the Department of Finance should be definitely charged with this duty; that the proceedings should be carried on in writing, and that the findings of this Department should be submitted to the Minister of Finance, and only those to which he raised objections should be referred to the Cabinet for discussion by the whole group of Ministers.

Owing to the changes which have been referred to, it is not necessary at the moment to refer to his section 3 on administrative methods, except as regards section (e), the distribution of work between the several departments or authorities.

He states as desirable that all work of the same character should be concentrated in one department, and makes the further suggestions, para. 126, that the Departments of Customs and Inland Revenue, as regards the outside service, should be amalgamated.

In conclusion he speaks of the importance of the development of the natural resources of the country; refers to the desirability instead of the present Conservation Commission for a small permanent Commission of three or at most five members, whose functions should be:—

(a) To initiate and work out—but not to execute—schemes for the utilisation in the future of the natural resources of the country;

(b) To examine and report upon every scheme affecting these resources, whether promoted by the Government or by private parties, before it is sanctioned by Parliament; and

(c) To train up a body of technical experts who could be transferred, as opportunity offered, to the permanent service in any department in which they were required. The Commission would, in short, be a thinking, planning, advising and training body, with no executive functions. It should be directly responsible to and under the general control of the Prime Minister.

And finally to general control of the public service, para. 128:—

"But of all the topics on which I have touched, the two which appear to me to be the most important are first, the relief of Ministers from routine and administrative duties, so that they may be set free for the consideration of policy; and secondly, the improvement of the organization and personnel of the public service so that it may be in a position to cope efficiently with the business of the country, not only in the present, but in the future, which is day by day developing additional work and fresh responsibilities.

I desire to urge as strongly as I may that for the creation and maintenance of an efficient Civil Service, three essential conditions are required:—

(1) The best material in the country must be attracted into it and induced to remain there;

(2) To this end the service must be so regulated as to provide a permanent career in which promotion will depend on individual merit exhibited in the daily performance of duty.

(3) It follows from this that the mutual relations of Ministers and Civil Servants alike must be conducted with a loyal and single-minded devotion to the public service, from which all considerations dependent on the political views of individuals should be wholly excluded.

Whether and how far it is possible to realize these conditions it is not for me to say. But I feel confident that, until they are realized, the public service will not be such as the Dominion is entitled to expect, or such as is essential for the proper transaction of its business."

LORD HALDANE'S COMMITTEE.

The Imperial Government, in 1917, appointed a committee on the machinery of Government, with the following reference:—

"To inquire into the responsibilities of the various departments of the central executive Government, and to advise in what manner the exercise and distribution by the Government of its functions should be improved."

We shall not attempt to summarize the findings of this report, written in a very concise form and great constraint of language; but we shall call attention to certain of their remarks which deal with the question in hand. The report says:—

The main functions of the Cabinet may, we think, be described as:—

- (a) The final determination of the policy to be submitted to Parliament.
- (b) The supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the policy prescribed by Parliament, and
- (c) The continuous co-ordination and delimitation of the activities of the several departments of State. For the due performance of these functions the following conditions seem to be essential, or, at least, desirable:—
 - (i) The Cabinet should be small in number—preferably ten or, at most, twelve;
 - (ii) It should meet frequently;
 - (iii) It should be supplied in the most convenient form with all the information and material necessary to enable it to arrive at expeditious decisions;
 - (iv) It should make a point of consulting personally all the ministers whose work is likely to be affected by its decisions; and
 - (v) It should have a systematic method of securing that its decisions are effectually carried out by the several departments concerned.

It quotes the report of the 1917 War Cabinet, which says:—

"The most important constitutional development in the United Kingdom during the last year has been the introduction of the War Cabinet system. This change was the direct outcome of the war itself. As the magnitude of the war increased, it became evident that the cabinet system of peace days was inadequate to cope with the novel conditions."

On which the committee makes the following comment:

But we think that a rearrangement of the supreme direction of the executive organization as it formerly existed has been rendered necessary, not merely by the war itself, but by the prospect after the war.

And, in answer to the question as to whether it is possible to return to the old order of things (which I take to mean those before the war), the committee states: "We feel confident that the latter question must be answered in the negative."

12. Turning next to the formulation of policy, we have come to the conclusion, after surveying what came before us, that in the sphere of civil government the duty of investigation and thought, as preliminary to action, might with great advantage be more definitely recognized. It appears to us that adequate provision has not been in the past for the organized acquisition of facts and information, and for the systematic application of thought, as preliminary to the settlement of policy and its subsequent administration.

13. This is no new motion The reason of the separation of work has been the proved impracticability of devoting the necessary time to thinking out organization and preparation for action in the mere interstices of the time required for the transaction of business.

14. . . . But we urge strongly (a) that in all departments better provision should be made for inquiry, research, and reflection before policy is defined and put into operation; (b) that for some purposes the necessary research and inquiry should be carried out or supervised by a department of government specially charged with these duties, but working in the closest collaboration with the administrative departments concerned with its activities; (c) that special attention should be paid to the methods of recruiting the personnel to be employed upon such work; and (d) that in all departments the higher officials in charge of administration should have more time to devote to this portion of their duties.

The report states that the commission did not feel called on to consider whether the new type of cabinet should consist of ministers in charge of the principal departments, or of the ministers without portfolios able to concentrate their whole attention upon the problems submitted for their consideration.

The report dealing with these general principles in the end of this part sums up the findings of this committee.

CONCLUSION.

55. If the principle which we have suggested in this part of our report, that the business of the various departments of government should be distributed as far as possible according to the class of service with which they are concerned, be accepted, the business of government would fall into one or other of the following main divisions:—

I.—Finance.

II and III.—National Defence and External Affairs.

IV.—Research and Information.

V.—Production (including Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries). Transport, and Commerce.

VI.—Employment.

VII.—Supplies.

VIII.—Education.

IX.—Health.

X.—Justice.

It does not necessarily follow that there would be only one minister for each of these branches. Some of them would undoubtedly require more than one.

56. In concluding this part of our report we may summarize briefly the main principles to which we have drawn attention as follows:—

(a) Further provision is needed in the sphere of civil government for the continuous acquisition of knowledge and the prosecution of research, in order to furnish a proper basis for policy.

(b) The distribution of business between administrative departments should be governed by the nature of the service which is assigned to each department. But close regard should be paid to the necessity for co-operation between departments in dealing with business of common interest.

(c) In the organization of individual departments special importance should be attached to securing proper consideration of proposals for expenditure, unimpaired ministerial responsibility, co-operation with advisory bodies in

matters which bring departments into contact with the public, and the extended employment of qualified women.

(d) A more efficient public service may expose the State to the evils of bureaucracy unless the reality of Parliamentary control is so enforced as to keep pace with any improvement in departmental methods.

In making these suggestions we are aware that an efficient departmental system working in satisfactory relations with Parliament cannot be established or maintained on lines laid down in advance by any committee of inquiry. Whatever validity may attach in the abstract to the principles which we have ventured to suggest, their practical efficacy will depend upon the zeal and discretion with which they are applied from day to day by Parliament, by ministers, and by the officers of departments, the living forces whose spirit is essential to any form of government that is more than a machine.

APPENDIX II.

THE WAR CABINETS.

The subject was debated in the House of Commons on February the 13th and 27th, 1918, (ref. H.C. Hansard U.K. 112-142 and 1401-1439) and in the House of Lords, June 19, 1918 (H.L. Hansard U.K. 239-287).

The most significant remark in the Commons debate on the program of the War Cabinet and its performance introduced by Mr. Herbert Samuel, a Member of the previous Asquith Government was:—

“I do not suggest the system of the old Cabinet and that was recognized”. and later in the same debate Mr. Bonar Law, the Leader of the Government in the House, made this statement. that men who were in the coalition Government had said to the Prime Minister when he was forming his Cabinet in December, 1916, that he must have a small Cabinet; That they would not enter the Government if it meant a War Council with a big Cabinet.

The debate in the House of Lords was begun by Viscount Midleton who called the attention to the report of the War Cabinet for 1917 and other cognate matters. Much of what he said does not, at least directly, give any light on Canadian matters. In following him the Marquis of Lansdowne said:—

“If I differ from him at all, it is perhaps because I realize rather more than he does the immense difficulty of adjusting out old-fashioned political machinery to the new conditions with which we have to deal in these days.

The other conclusion which I think emerges is this—that whatever is done it is idle to think, for the present at all events, that there can be any question of going back to the old system of Cabinet Government, as we know it before the War. . . . I venture to say that we have a right to regard the old Cabinet as being, so to speak, the very “hub” of the Political machine”. . . . “But even before the war the machinery did begin to creak. I think the trouble really arose from the rapid increase in the number of the members of the Cabinet. It became an unwieldy body”. . . . “If only a few of them (members of the Cabinet) took part, the Cabinet ceased to be representative. If many of them took part the proceedings tended to become prolix and interminable, and it is a matter of common knowledge that reasons of that kind led to the practice of transacting a good deal of the more important work of the Government through the agency of an informal inner Cabinet.”

He went on to say that the Ministers, not members of the Cabinet, seemed to have gained in their own departments very considerable power. The limit of that power seemed to be when they encroached on the territory of some other minister, but that they were no longer responsible for the questions of general policy.

These and other speakers on the same side were answered by Lord Curzon. He agreed with Lord Lansdowne's back to the old Cabinet system. He stated:—

"I certainly formed an impression at the time that that Cabinet was faulty for the purposes of peace, and quite impossible in time of war."

His later remarks throw some light on the manner in which business was conducted in the Cabinet. There was no agenda. There was no order of business. A Minister had to get the permission of the Prime Minister to bring up any matter, but no other member of the Cabinet, broadly speaking was warned in advance. No record was kept of the proceedings.

"The Cabinet often had the very haziest notion as to what its decisions were; and I appeal not only to my own experience but to the experience of every Cabinet Minister who sits in this House, and to the records contained in the Memoirs of half a dozen Prime Ministers in the past, that cases frequently arose when the matter was left so much in doubt that a Minister went away and acted upon what he thought was a decision which subsequently turned out to be no decision at all, or was repudiated by his Colleagues. . . Ministers found the utmost difficulty in securing decisions because the Cabinet was always congested with business; "I do not think anyone will deny that the old Cabinet system had irretrievably broken down, both as a war machine and as a peace machine. This was partly due, no doubt, to the size of the Cabinet, which had swollen to the preposterous number of twenty-three or twenty-four."

Lord Curzon found great advantage in the present system by which a Minister brought to the Cabinet, if he so elected, the Departmental experts by whom he is guided and by whose counsel he may wish his opinion to be fortified when he meet the Cabinet. The Cabinet benefits in Lord Curzon's opinion, because they hear the expert's opinion from his own lips.

In closing he said:—

"I think you will find the Cabinets in the future will all be subject to a great reduction of numbers from the old and ever-swollen total to which reference has been made. I do not think we shall ever have a Cabinet of twenty-two or twenty-three Ministers again. Secondly, I think the presence of other Ministers than Cabinet Ministers at the discussions will also become an inevitable feature of future Cabinet procedure. Thirdly, the preparation of an agenda in order that we may know in advance what we are going to discuss is inevitable and essential feature of business-like procedure in any Assembly in the world. Fourthly, I doubt whether it will be possible to dispense with the assistance of a Secretary in future. Fifthly, I think that a record and minutes of the proceedings will have to be kept; and, lastly, I hope for a very considerable development of the system of devolution and decentralization of government work which I have described."

The system of devolution to which he referred, he had previously stated consisted in referring questions to one or two Members of the War Cabinet for decision, and to the Committee on a special subject, which had developed into a system of permanent committees.

The connection between these Committees and the War Cabinet was secured by the fact that the Chairman was either a member of the War Cabinet or a person who had access to the whole of the Cabinet proceedings, through the Secretaries, and by the circulation among the members of the War Cabinet of the proceedings of these Committees.

A note of opposition to views of the Government, for which Lord Curzon was spokesman in the Lords, was struck by Lord Salisbury:—

“His idea of an ideal Cabinet is a number of gentlemen who are not engaged in Departmental work, who sit as judges before whom the various Ministers, or others interested, are called in to plead and to hear decisions by them. That I believe to be a thoroughly bad system. What you want is not to be governed by people who acquire the information they ask for at the moment, but by people who have constant experience in the administration of affairs. Those are, and can only be, the Departmental Ministers who are soaked in the work of their Departments. It is not a question of hearing in ten minutes or a quarter of an hour a case put forward by one man, and the contrary case put forward by another man, and then deciding between them. That is not the method which has prevailed in this country, and which ought to prevail. Our system has been that the Ministers who are actually engaged in the conduct of affairs, who have at their command the best talent of any particular subject that the world can provide, who live, and move, and have their being every day in the transaction of a particular subject, should meet together and come to a decision. It is that very point of view of my noble friend, which seems to me to mark the difference between him and ourselves as to what is the proper method of government.”

In the House of Commons when Mr. Lloyd George formed his War Cabinet, he said in the course of his Address, December, 1916 (H.C. Hansard, U.K., 1942-3):—

“This is not the first time you have had heads of Departments outside the Cabinet. As a matter of fact, the practice of putting every head of a Department inside the Cabinet is quite a modern innovation, and the way in which Governments have been in the habit of dealing with that situation is whenever there is anything that concerns a particular Department, the head of that Department, with his officers, attends the executive committee and you immediately get into contact with each other and discuss those problems which require solution. That is an old practice. I think it is a very effective practice. It is very much better, especially in time of war, than keeping men away from their Departments discussing things which do not directly concern them. But while undoubtedly their counsel may be very valuable, when you have a considerable number of people brought together you are apt to create confusion and thus to delay decision.” “There seems to be a little concern lest the new organization should have the effect of lessening parliamentary control. I wonder why on earth it would do that. Each Minister answers for his Department exactly in the same way as under the old system. Each Minister is accountable for his Department to Parliament, and the Government as a whole are accountable to Parliament. The control of Parliament must, and always must, be supreme because it represents the nation. There is not the slightest attempt here to derogate in any particular from the complete control of Parliament. I do not think the present methods of parliamentary control are efficient, but that is not a change which has come about through the new Administration. I have always thought that the methods of parliamentary control, and I speak here as a fairly old parliamentarian, rather tended to give undue prominence to trivialities—my right honourable friend and I have talked over this matter many a time—and on the other hand that it rather tended to minimize and ignore realities. Whether you can improve upon that I personally have never had any doubt, but I have always thought—I do not know whether I carry any one with me on this except my honourable friend who sits there—that the French system was a more effective one—the system whereby Ministers have to appear before parliamentary committees, where

questions can be asked them, and where they can give an action which they would not care to give in public. I think that in many respects that system has helped to save France from one or two very serious blunders. I am not committing the Government to that beyond this, that we are investigating that question. It is just possible we might refer the matter to Parliament to settle for itself, because it is not so much a question for the Government as a question for Parliament itself to decide, subject, of course, to any criticism or suggestion which the Government might wish to make as to the best and most efficient methods during a period of war of exercising parliamentary control over the Departments."

RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EXPENDITURE.

The Select Committee on National Expenditure consists of twenty-six members. In their ninth annual report, which was printed in October, 1918, this Committee stated as follows:—

That securing information for the deliberation of the Committee was confided to a sub-committee, which decided to proceed by way of written question and answer:—

"They framed a Questionnaire which was sent to Mr. Speaker, the Chairman of Ways and Means and the Deputy Chairman; to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the ex-Chancellors; to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and the ex-Financial Secretaries; to certain other Members of the House representative of parties; to the Comptroller and Auditor General; to certain Government Officials and to a small number of others whose views it was thought desirable to ascertain." (Par. 1.)

Both the questions and the report of the Committee refer to peace conditions. The report states:—

"The replies show, with few exceptions, a consensus of opinion that the present system of parliamentary control over expenditure is inadequate. In that view we concur. Indeed our terms of reference themselves, inviting proposals to render control more effective, indicate that the House is not satisfied with the existing procedure." (Par. 2.)

They state that Treasury control, invaluable as it is up to a certain point, is not a substitute for parliamentary control. They point out that the investigation of the Comptroller and Auditor General is retroactive and conclude this portion of their report with:—

"It is sometimes urged that the only safeguard against extravagance likely to be successful is to be found in the Ministers and officials of the Spending Departments themselves; that Parliament should be content to rely upon them; that any attempt at direct control would be ineffective, because it could not be sufficiently painstaking and minute, and harmful, because Ministers would feel that the final responsibility had been transferred from their shoulders, and that they were no longer expected to exercise a meticulous care.

"We cannot subscribe to that doctrine. It would convert the responsibility of Ministers into irresponsibility. It contemplates an executive which would be autocratic so far as expenditure is concerned, subject only to audit in order to ensure honesty, and to the extreme measure of dismissal in case of gross abuse. If, however, it is answered that it is not intended to push the doctrine so far, and that the present practice provides the right admixture of Ministerial responsibility and parliamentary control, we would express the conviction that the House of Commons ought not to accept a system which recognizes

its authority so long as it is never exercised, and concedes the appearance of control on the condition that it is not made a reality.

"Nor we can agree that Ministers and their officials, on whom in the first instance, it is true, dependence must be placed for the avoidance of waste, would be likely to become less careful if they knew that their estimates would undergo in Parliament an effective, instead of an ineffective, review."

"To regard the Executive, whether it be the Sovereign or whether it be a Ministry dependent upon Parliament, as the sole authority to limit the sums which ought to be provided for each Branch of the Public Service is contrary, in our judgment, to the principles on which the Constitution is based. We consider that the House of Commons, as the representative of the taxpayer, should reassert, fully and effectively, its right of restricting the amounts to be allotted for each head of the National expenditure, and we recommend the adoption of the measures to that end, which we now proceed to detail." (Par. 7.)

The great majority of the gentlemen asked for their opinion, among whom it may be repeated, were all the officials of the House of Commons, were of the opinion that estimates should be examined by a select Committee. They recommend that there should be appointed in the ordinary way, at the beginning of each session two standing Committees on Estimates, each consisting of fifteen Members and suggest the possibility of the necessity of a third Committee, stating that they prefer this course, after consideration, to a much larger Committee. They were of the opinion that the Public Accounts Committee should not be amalgamated with the Committees proposed to be established, but suggested that it might be advisable for some Members to serve on both Committees. (Par 8-14.)

They advise that it should not be within the competence of the Committees to make any recommendations inconsistent with the policy implied in the Estimates, and they make the following statement of principle:—

"The House of Commons itself has foregone the power and does not now seek the power, to increase the estimates submitted to it on behalf of the Crown. Its Committees cannot possess a larger authority. The duty of the Estimates Committees would be to suggest desirable economies, and they should not be authorized to propose increased expenditure. There may, no doubt, be cases, however, in which it might be proper to indicate that a larger capital expenditure, for example, upon the plant of some Government establishment, would result in an economy through a more than equivalent saving in working expenses."

"We therefore recommend that the Committees should be assisted by an Officer of the House, to be appointed for the purpose, with the title of Examiner of Estimates. His duty would be to collect from his own study of the Estimates, from information obtained officially or semi-officially, from communications received from Members of the House or from the public, facts which would indicate to the Estimates Committees useful lines of inquiry. He would stand in much the same relation to them as the Comptroller and Auditor General stands to the Public Accounts Committee. His salary would be borne upon the vote of the House of Commons Officers. It would not be necessary to attach to him any large specialized staff, but experience might show that it was desirable to furnish him with one or more technical assistants, and the clerical establishment of the House would render such service as might be required. (Par. 14.)

After various recommendations as to procedure in the House of Commons among them that estimates be brought down at the earliest practicable date, they go on:—

"That it should be the duty of the Chairman of an Estimates Committee, or of some other Member nominated for the purpose, to be present in the House

when the occasion was offered for the discussion of its recommendations, and to speak in their support, and the duty of the Minister in charge of the Vote either to accept the recommendations or to give reasons for not doing so." (Par. 16, sec. 7.)

Then follows a very important recommendation:—

"We are convinced that these measures, while they would go far to secure the object in view, would not be adequate for their purpose without one further change of fundamental importance in the practice of the House. The spirit in which the proposed Committees would carry on their work, the attitude of Ministers towards their recommendations, the confidence of the people at large in their activities, will all depend upon the degree of support which they are enabled to receive from the House of Commons itself. But the House will not be free to give them support so long as the present convention continues, which introduces into every division on a proposal of the Government of the day—however unimportant, however remote from broad considerations of National policy—the question of confidence or want of confidence in that Government. It is plain that if, on a division on some minor economy in a Departmental estimate, a majority adverse to the Government is to be regarded as a censure, even as a reason for its resignation, or for subjecting the country to a general election, the smaller issue must be completely eclipsed by the larger, and that a decision on the merits of the particular question must become impossible. Only when the House of Commons is free, not merely in theory and under the forms of the Constitution, but in fact and in custom, to vote, when the occasion requires, upon the strict merits of proposed economies, uncomplicated by any wider issue, will its control over the National expenditure become a reality.

"The Estimates Committee will be precluded from dealing with policy. That limitation should exclude from their recommendations any proposals which, if carried against the Government, should properly entail either their resignation or a dissolution of Parliament.

"We recommend that the House of Commons, if it approves and decides to act upon our proposals for the establishment of Estimates Committees, should also resolve that any motion carried in Committee of Supply in pursuance of the recommendations of those Committees, should not be taken to imply that the Government of the day no longer possessed the confidence of the House." (Para. 17.)

And the Committee concludes its report by a summary of its findings.

APPENDIX III.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AS TO CABINETS OF VARIOUS NATIONS.

The United Kingdom.—The statement does not include positions of ministerial rank concerned with Scotland and Ireland.

A Bill was introduced into the Commons in February "to establish a ministry of ways and communications."

France.—The Cabinet numbers 14.

The Ministries of Munitions and Blockade are the result of the war.

The Ministries of Colonies and Public Instruction have no equivalent in Canada, so that functions corresponding to those of the Canadian Government are carried on by ten.

Italy, 15.—Reduced by colonies, 1; education, 13; pre-war, 12.

Pre-war Germany.—The business of the Empire was carried on by 8 Ministers, including colonies, 6 heads of bureaux, say 13.

Norway, 13, or normally 11.

Australia, 9 and 5 Honorary Ministers (8 + 2 Hon. Ministers in 1914).

New Zealand, 12 (1914 = 9).

South Africa, 10, and 1 without portfolio.

The United States.—Its executive is made up of ten cabinet officers.

Canada has 18 ministers (not including the overseas Minister of Militia, and the Ministry of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment, both temporary in character). Two are ministers without portfolio.

Canada.—It has also the Solicitor General and 3 parliamentary under-secretaries.

The United Kingdom	48	Germany..	13
Canada	20	New Zealand	12
Australia	14	South Africa.. . . .	11
Italy..	13	France..	10
Norway..	13	The, United States.. . . .	10

MINISTRIES OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

THE MINISTRY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1919.

(*Not including the Royal Household.*)

War Cabinet—

Right Honourable D. Lloyd George,	Prime Minister.
"	Lord Curzon, Ld. President of the Council.
"	Austin Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer.
"	A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal.
"	G. A. Barnes (without portfolio).

Ministers—

D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.
 Lord Birkenhead (Sir F. E. Smith), Lord High Chancellor.
 Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords.
 A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, and Leader of the House of Commons.
 Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer.
 Walter Long, First Lord of the Admiralty.
 George N. Barnes (without portfolio).
 Sir Eric Geddes, G.C.B. (without portfolio).

Secretaries of State—

Edward Shortt, K.C., Home Affairs.
 Arthur J. Balfour, O.M., Foreign Affairs.
 Viscount Milner, G.C.B., Colonies.
 Winston S. Churchill, War and Air.
 E. S. Montagu, India.
 Robert Munro, K.C., Secretary for Scotland.
 J. I. Macpherson, Chief Secretary to Lord Lieutenant.
 A. H. Illingworth, Postmaster General.

Presidents of Committees of Council—

Sir Albert Stanley, Board of Trade.
 Dr. C. Addison, Local Government Board.
 R. E. Protheroe, M.V.O., Board of Agriculture.
 H. A. L. Fisher, Board of Education.
 Andrew Weir, Minister of Munitions (Supply).
 G. H. Roberts, Minister of Food.
 Sir J. Maclay, Bt., Minister of Shipping.
 Sir R. S. Horne, K.B.E., K.C., Minister of Labour.
 Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bt., Minister of Pensions.
 Sir Auckland Geddes, K.C.B., Minister of National Service and Reconstruction.
 Earl of Crawford, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
 Sir Alfred Mond, Bt., First Commissioner of Works.

War Cabinet—

Sir Gordon Hewart, K.C., Attorney General.
 Sir Ernest Pollock, K.C., Solicitor General.
 H. Pike Pease, Assistant Postmaster General.
 Sir J. Compton-Rickett, Postmaster General.
 T. J. Macnamara—Parly. and Financial Sec. to Admiralty.
 H. W. Forster—Parly. and Financial Sec. War and Air.

Treasury—

Junior Lords, J. F. Hope; J. W. Pratt; J. Parker, C. H.; J. T. Jones (unp.)
 Joint Financial Secretaries, Sir H. Lever, K.C.B.; S. Baldwin.
 Joint Parliamentary Secretaries, Lord E. Talbot; Hon. F. E. Guest.

Parliamentary Under Secretaries—

Sir H. Greenwood, Bt.—Home Affairs.
 Cecil Harmsworth—Foreign Affairs.
 Col. L.C.M.S. Amery—Colonies.
 Maj.-Gen, J. E. B. Seely, C.B.—Air.
 Viscount Peel—War.
 Sir S. P. Sinha—India.

FRANCE.

Ministry—

President of the Republic.
 Premier and Minister of war.
 Minister of Justice.
 Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 Minister of the Interior.
 Minister of Finance.
 Minister of Marine.
 Minister of Commerce.
 Minister of Public Works.
 Minister of Munitions.
 Minister of Public Instructions.
 Minister of the Colonies.
 Minister of Labour.
 Minister of Blockade.
 Minister of Supplies and Agriculture.

ITALY.

King, Victor Emmanuel.

Cabinet—

Premier.
 Foreign Affairs.
 Justice.
 War.
 Marine.
 Public Assistance and Pensions.
 Treasury.
 Finance.
 Agriculture.
 Commerce and Labour.
 Public Works.
 Posts and Telegraphs.
 Transport and Munitions.
 Colonies.
 Public Instruction.

GERMANY.

Chancellor of the Empire.
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
 Imperial Home Office and 'Representative of the Chancellor.'
 Imperial Admiralty, Admiral Commanding-in-Chief.
 Imperial Secretary of Justice.
 Imperial Treasury.
 Imperial Post Office.
 Secretary for the Colonies.

Presidents of the Imperial bureaux—

Railways.
 Imperial Exchequer.
 Imperial Bank.
 Imperial Debt Commission.
 Administration of Imperial Railways.
 Imperial Court Martial.

NORWAY.

President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of State, and Minister of
 Agriculture.
 Foreign Affairs.
 Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction.
 Justice and Police.
 Commerce, Navigation, and Industry.
 Public works.
 Interior.
 War Supplies.
 Defence.
 Finance and Customs.
 Supplies.
 State Secretary.

AUSTRALIA.

Executive Council—

Prime Minister and Attorney General.
 Minister for the Navy.
 Treasurer.
 Minister of Defence.
 Vice-President, Executive Council.
 Minister for Repatriation.
 Minister for Works and Railways.
 Minister of State for Home and Territories.
 Minister of State for Trade and Customs.
 Honorary Ministers.

NEW ZEALAND.

His Excellency the Governor General.
 Prime Minister, Minister of Labour, Industries and Commerce.
 Commissioner of State Forests, Minister in Charge of Valuation and Electoral Departments.
 Minister of Finance, Postmaster General and Minister of Telegraphs,
 Minister in Charge of Land and Income Tax, State Advances, Public Trust, and Government Life Insurance Departments.
 Minister of Defence and Minister in Charge of War Pensions.
 Minister of Railways and Native Minister.
 Minister of Public Works and Minister in Charge of Roads Dept.
 Minister of Internal Affairs, Public Health, Minister in Charge of Hospitals and Charitable Aid, Mental Hospitals, Printing and Stationery, High Commissioner's; Audit; Museum, Registrar General's, Census and Statistics and Laboratory Departments.
 Minister of Customs, Minister in Charge of Munitions and Supplies, Pensions, Advertising, and National Provident Fund Departments.
 Attorney General, Minister of Immigration and Leader of the Legislative Council.
 Minister of Agricultural, Mines, Minister in Charge of Legislative, Public Buildings, Inspection of Machinery, State Fire and Accident Insurance, and Tourist and Health Resorts Departments.
 Minister of Education, and Minister in Charge of Friendly Societies.
 Minister of Justice, Marine and Stamp Duties.
 Minister of Lands, Minister in Charge of Land for Settlements and Scenery preservation.
 Representing the Native Race, Minister of Maori Councils.
 Clerk of the Executive Council.

Public Officers—

Public Service Commissioner.
 Assistant Public Service Commissioner.
 Solicitor General, Contoller and Auditor General, Commissioner Govt. Life Insurance Dept.
 Public Trustee.
 Inspector General Mental Hospitals.
 Inspector General of Hospitals and Chief Health Officer.

SOUTH AFRICA.

Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs.

Minister of the Interior and Public Works.

Minister of Defence.

Minister of Mines and Industries and of Education.

Minister of Railways and Harbours.

Minister of Finance.

Minister of Justice.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

Minister of Agriculture.

Minister of Lands.

Minister without Portfolio.

Table of General Comparative arrangement in Canada and the United States of Executive Government.

UNITED STATES.		CANADA.	
DEPARTMENTS.	SUBSIDIARY.	DEPARTMENTS.	SUBSIDIARY.
(1) <i>State.</i> <i>Negotiations relating to Foreign Affairs.</i> Secretary. Counsellor. Assistant Secretary. 2nd Assistant Secretary. 3rd Assistant Secretary.	8 Bureaux. Legal Adviser (Solicitor). Foreign Trade Adviser.	(1) <i>State.</i> <i>External Affairs.</i> Secretary (Prime Minister). Under-Secretary. Assistant Under-Secretary. Legal Adviser.	Secretary of State (Minister). Under-Secretary. Assistant Under-Secretary. Mines—Deputy Minister. Archives—Dominion Archivist.
(2) <i>Treasury.</i> <i>Secretary (in charge of National Finances).</i> <i>Plans for Revenue and Public Credit.</i> 5 Assistant Secretaries. Comptroller of Treasury. Treasurer of U.S. Collection of Revenue. Customs. Internal Revenue. War Risk Insee. <i>Warrants for receipts and payment.</i> <i>Coinage and printing of money.</i>	Foreign Loans. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Fiscal Bureau. Comptroller of Currency. Secret Service, and Printing. Mint. Asst. Secretary. Architect. Bureau.	(2) <i>Finance.</i> Minister. Deputy Minister. Asst. Deputy Minister. Treasury Board. (Department of Customs.) (Department of Inland Revenue.) Commissioner of Taxation. Receiver General. Comptroller of Currency. Dominion Police (Justice Department). Printing Bureau (Secretary of State). Mint. (Department of Public Works.) Not Specially Organized. Department of Health (Immigration).	Insurance Department, Supt. of Insee.

UNITED STATES.

*Justice.**Represents U. S. in all legal matters.*

- (1) Attorney General.
 (2) Solicitor General. (3) Assistant to Attorney General.
 (4) 7 Assistant Attorneys General.

(4) *Post Office.*

Management of P. O.
 Postmaster General.
 4 Assistant Postmasters General.

CANADA.

(3) *Justice.**Minister and Attorney General.*

Solicitor General.
 Deputy Minister.

Supreme Court.
 Exchequer Court.

(4) *Post Office.*

Minister. (Postmaster General.)
 Deputy Postmaster General.
 Assistant Deputy Postmaster General.
 Assistant Deputy Minister.
 14 Branches.

UNITED STATES.

(5) *Interior.*

Public Lands and Parks—Patents, Pensions,
 Education—Indian Affairs—Geological Surveys, etc.

Secretary.

2 Assistant Secretaries.
 Land Office.
 Pension Office.
 Patent Office.
 Indian Affairs.
 Education.
 Geological Survey.
 Reclamation Survey.
 Mines.
 National Parks.

CANADA.

(5) *Interior.**Minister.*

Deputy Minister.
 Assistant Deputy Minister.
 Secretary's Branch.
 Accounts Branch.
 Law Clerk.

(Board of Pension Commissioners.)
 Patents Branch (Department of Trade and Commerce).
 Department of Indian Affairs.
 Topographical and Geodetic Survey.
 (Secretary of State Department.)
 National Parks.
 Dominion Lands.
 Mining Lands and Yukon Branch.
 Forestry Branch.
 Dominion Water Power Branch.
 Dominion Astronomical Branch.
 Ordnance and Admiralty Branch.

UNITED STATES.

(6) *Agriculture.*

Agricultural quarantine of cattle.
Inspection of food and drugs—forest reserves and interstate game laws.

Secretary.

Asst. Secretary.

Animal Industry.
Plant "
Forest Service.
Chemistry.
Soils.
Weather.
Entomology.
Biological Survey.
Crop Estimates.
States Relation Services.
Public Roads.
Rural Organization.
Farm Management.

CANADA.

(6) *Agriculture.*

Minister.

Deputy Minister.
Asst. Dep. Minister.
Commissioner of Agriculture.

Health of Animals and Live Stock Branch.
Seed Branch and Agrostologist.
(Interior Department).
Chemical Lab. under Experimental Farm.

Entomological Branch.

Experimental Farm Branch.
Dairy and Cold Storage.
Fruit Branch.

UNITED STATES.

(7) *Commerce.* Promotion of Commerce in all branches and transportation.

Secretary.

Asst.-Secretary.

Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
Statistics, Information and Investigation.
Census.

Coast and Geographical Survey.

Navigation.
Commercial Marine.
S. S. Inspection.
Lighthouses.
Fisheries.
Standards.

(7) *Trade and Commerce.*

Minister.

Deputy Minister.
Solicitor of Patents
Registrar of Trade Marks and Copyrights.
General Trade Commissioner and Canadian
Board of Grain Commissioners for Canada. Census and Statistics
Branch.

(Interior Department.)

(Department of Marine.)

(Department of Marine.)

(Department of Fisheries.)

(Department of Interior.)

Supervision of Bounties.
Supervision of Subsidized Services.

CANADA

(8) *Labour*.
Minister.
Deputy Minister.
{ Department of Immigration }
" "
Labour Gazette.
Director—Employment Service.

CANADA

Railway Commissioners.

Civil Service Commission
Printing Bureau.
Fine Arts.

Advisory Research Council.
Dominion Government Amnities.
Commission of Conservation.
Department of Public Information.
International Waterways Commission.
Reconstruction and Development Committee.


UNITED STATES.

8) *Labour*.
Welfare of wage earners of United States.
Secretary.
Immigration.
Naturalization.
Labour Statistics.
Children's Bureau.
U.S. Employment Service.

UNITED STATES.

(9) *Independent Organizations*.
Interstate Commerce Com.
Federal Reserve Board.
Federal Trade Board Enforcement of Anti-Trust Laws.
Employees' Compensation Board (7th Sept., 1916).
Mediation and Conciliation (July, 1913).
Civil Service Commission.
Printing Office.
Fine Arts.
Pan-American Union.
Tariff Commission.





















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